Counter-insurgency Seldom Works: A Long Costly Slog

As the American people become increasing tired of the war in Afghanistan, the military and the administration keep looking for victories that will show that the war is winnable. Fewer people believe that everyday.

Most wars of history involve “traditional” methods taught in military academies, where a sort of chess game was played between the sides. In Afghanistan, there is no clear enemy and one that certainly does not subscribe to the “rules of war.” The insurgency continues on with the U.S. and (dwindling) allies playing a sort of “Whack-a-Mole” but never getting to the core.

Guerilla warfare is not new, but it is the lesser method that is often looked down upon by our trained generals. The problem, it seems, is that there are no rules, and therefore hard to define the “game.” In the U.S. Revolutionary War, the colonists essentially won by their guerrilla methods attacking from all sides, within towns, and often without a uniform to identify the combatants from the citizenry.

In the U.S. Civil War, the Confederate Quantrill’s Raiders were successful at terrorizing the people and the Union armies alike. In fact, in 1865 when General Lee could see that the cause was lost, he kept fighting for honor. He was approached by his soldiers who begged him to let them fight by insurgency and guerilla methods, which Lee knew to be their only chance for any success. He knew that insurgents would wreak terror and murder on the North with the Union army unable to quell the actions. Lee knew that he would not have to surrender and that the army as guerillas could keep the population terrorized for decades, and eventually the North would ask for a truce. This was the best and probably only chance the Confederacy had of any success in keeping their new country and with it, its slavery.

Yet Lee, a statesman at heart, also knew he could not put his country (the U.S.A., not just the C.S.A) through this prolonged nightmare of unending battle. He chose to say no to those who wanted to mix with the population and fight in the streets. He did not want to have the country go through that pain.

Today we have a similar situation in Afghanistan. The insurgents will continue to terrorize and mix with the population to plant bombs, murder civilians, execute aid workers, and the U.S. with all its might cannot whack the last mole. Lee was right in thinking that the Union would eventually declare a truce and stop the war, especially after Lincoln was gone. Today, the same thing is starting to happen. Public support is fading and successes are few. Afghanistan does not want our help, cannot form a government that works, and fails to even police themselves. While fighting insurgents we are desperately training Afghans to take over and they are not up to the job. It will not work. We must preserve what treasure we have left, and certainly spill no more blood thinking that we are fighting the ghost of al-Qaeda. No one seems to have a better idea.